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The history of American involvement with the International
Labor Organization (ILO) and the international labor standards
movement uncovers intriguing leadership and motivation, surprising
triumph in the 1930s, and then relentless criticism. American
involvement in the ILO began as an effort to overcome Supreme
Court opposition to national labor standards. With domestic judicial
opposition to standards gone after World War II, America's remark-
able early leadership diminished when domestic attacks on the ILO
undermined American defense of universal labor rights.
The American who led the United States into the ILO is as ob-
scure today as the story of wavering American membership. John
Winant, whom Franklin Roosevelt first sent to Geneva in 1935, pre-
viously served as Republican governor of New Hampshire. How and
why did a governor of New Hampshire, from the opposition, come to
this role? The answer originates in the decline after 1920 of the textile
mills in Manchester, New Hampshire. That circumstance propelled
Winant to the leadership of those, including Roosevelt, who saw
national and then international labor standards as one solution to
regional economic decline. Given the exceptionally cautious Ameri-
can embrace of uniform labor law, especially by the courts, FDR's
collaboration with Winant, a Republican internationalist, made sense.
The ILO is the only survivor of the international organizations
created at the Versailles Conference and the only one the U.S. joined
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in the isolationist, interwar period. Created to assure that the evolving
global trading regime would be marked by fair treatment of workers,
the annual ILO conference passes labor conventions and sends them
to the member countries for ratification. For example, the first con-
vention in 1919 limited the work day to eight hours and the work week
to forty-eight. Winant and his allies turned to the ILO after their ini-
tial approach to national labor standards, through the interstate com-
pact process, failed for want of state cooperation. They realized that if
Congress ratified ILO conventions as treaties, they would be part of
the country's fundamental law, voiding court rejection.
Just as Winant triumphed, the constitutional revolution of the
late 1930s and the global confusion during World War II made his
approach irrelevant. Then, in the immediate postwar years, the
American right-wing joined with the Soviet Union to denounce the
ILO. A depressed Winant committed suicide in Concord, New
Hampshire. When the ILO passed conventions mandating universal
health insurance and maternity leave, American business launched an
effort to amend the Constitution to prevent treaties from changing
U.S. domestic law. Although unsuccessful with the "Bricker Amend-
ment," the attacks doomed American ratification of any substantive
conventions for forty years.
Part II of this study will begin by reviewing the growing aware-
ness before 1925 of the crisis in the New England textile industry and
the emergence of John Winant as a concerned leader. Part III exam-
ines the early effort to confront the decline with new corporate and
public policies. Part IV chronicles the pursuit of labor standards
through interstate compacts and alternatives. Part V focuses upon
joining the ILO and the questions that arose regarding the relation-
ship of conventions to domestic law. Part VI describes the post-
World War II attacks on the ILO which undermined, until the 1990s,
the United States' willingness to protect global labor rights.
II. THE LABOR STANDARDS DEBATE BEFORE
THE GREAT DEPRESSION
A. The Case of the New England Textile Industry
In 1906, T.M. Young, an English journalist, visited Manchester,
New Hampshire, while writing a series on the American textile indus-
try for The Manchester Guardian. He contrasted the town and its mills
with his paper's hometown, for which the New Hampshire city had
been named in the 1830s. He noted:
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Unlike its great-grandmother, it has clean air, clear water, and
sunny skies; every street is an avenue of noble trees .... Per-
haps the handsomest, certainly the most impressive, buildings in
Manchester are the Amoskeag and Manchester Mills.... Ris-
ing sheer out of a deep, clear, swift-flowing stream (the Merri-
mack), upon the other bank of which are grass and trees, they
need little more than to be silent to masquerade successfully as
ancient colleges.'
Tommy Smith, a dye house worker hired at the Amoskeag Mills
a year after Young's visit, later recalled the grandeur and ceremony of
the factory. "Each of the mills had its own bell tower; and when the
signal came over the electric wire, the bell ringers would jump onto the
ropes.... When the bells rang it was time to go home."2 When the
workers departed for the day, they were not replaced by another shift.
Amoskeag did not operate at night. Without romanticizing life for the
mass of workers in Manchester, this was a humane community, and
the mills were a more informal work place than other, later industrial
operations. That is not because the community was homogeneous or
the factory a small tight knit work place. Quite the contrary, Man-
chester's work force came from throughout the western world, from
Scottish dye house employees such as Smith, to Poles, Italians,
Greeks, and, especially, French Canadians. And the mills were not
small. In fact, Amoskeag, by 1906, was the largest textile mill in the
world, stretching for a mile along the Merrimack on the east and half a
mile on the west. It supplied the upholstery for Henry Ford's Model
T, and it sold massive quantities of cloth to buyers such as J.C. Pen-
ney and Marshall Field. It was unlike the later industrial world, where
companies maximized production through round-the-clock and year-
round operations. Amoskeag's production varied seasonally and
workers came and went as the plant needed them. Amoskeag could
function in this way because of its stability. It had been around for
most of the century and had generational loyalty among its managers,
who in turn knew their work force. The French Canadian workers
returned to their ancestral Quebec towns and farms during slow sea-
sons, yet supervisors knew how to find them when demand increased.
Of course, Amoskeag had not succeeded by maintaining static
organizational structures. In 1910, the company began to introduce
scientific management practices, created a separate personnel office for
hiring, and introduced features of welfare capitalism, such as night
1. TAMARA HAREVEN, FAMILY TIME AND INDUSTRIAL TIME 35-36 (1982).
2. TAMARA HAREVEN & RANDOLPH LANGENBACH, AMOSKEAG LIFE AND WORK IN
AN AMERICAN FACTORY CITY 223-24 (1978).
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classes, playgrounds, and baseball teams for employees.' These were
the newest fads in the business world, and Amoskeag was a major
American corporation that led the business community. Business
continued to boom, especially during World War I. Scientific manag-
ers found new ways to maximize production and profits. However, in
their fascination with efficiency, they could be tactless. They raised
wages to reward productivity increases, but only 7.5%, while mills in
Massachusetts increased theirs ten percent. The United Textile
Workers of the AFL began organizing workers in 1918. Two strikes
came that summer, but were settled quickly to maintain war produc-
tion. But two forces had been introduced irreversibly into the for-
merly paternalistic or, as one worker called it, feudal world of
Amoskeag: scientific management and organized labor.4
B. Changing Dynamics in the Textile Industry
The serious consequences of these factors and others beyond
Manchester that would influence Amoskeag had not been felt in 1919.
The war ended, the boys came home, and working conditions contin-
ued to improve. As a result of union demands, the company reduced
the workweek from fifty-four to forty-eight hours per week. Since the
piece work rates did not change, this reduction in hours cut worker
incomes, but on June 2, 1919, Amoskeag increased rates fifteen per-
cent. Piece rates went up in December and again in May 1920. But
times had changed. The last boom for Amoskeag had passed. By the
beginning of 1921, workweek reductions followed declining demand
for Amoskeag products, and the company cut piece rates by 22.5%.'
Meanwhile, the scientific managers found ways to increase the number
of looms workers ran, adversely affecting product quality as well as
morale.
The corporation's grievance procedure revealed a looming crisis.
One-third of the formal complaints were about declining quality, but
management now worried more about profits than quality or workers.6
Then, in 1922, it had to worry about a massive ten month strike that
shattered the balance at Amoskeag. Over 12,000 workers walked off
the job, and the national guard came to town to protect the mills. The
strike ended only after the exhausted union accepted the mediation of
local clergy. The 1922 agreement satisfied neither the union nor the
3. See HAREVEN, supra note 1, at 38-68, 138-48.
4. HAREVEN & LANGENBACH, supra note 2, at 233 (on feudalism); HAREVEN, supra note
1, at 289 (on two features added at the time, a union and scientific management).
5. See DANIEL CREAMER & CHARLES W. COULTER, LABOR AND THE SHUTDOWN OF
THE AMOSKEAG TEXTILE MILLS (1939).
6. See HAREVEN, supra note 1, at 302.
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company.7 Not surprisingly, the problems in Manchester came to the
attention of political leaders in the state, particularly the young war
hero, John Winant. He responded most directly and profited most
successfully from the Amoskeag problem, eventually seeing the link
between the problems of Manchester and American constitutional tra-
ditions that constrained enactment of national labor standards.8
C. John Winant and the Progressive Labor Movement
Born in New York of well-to-do parents, Winant seemed an
unlikely defender of the working class. He came to New Hampshire
as a youth to attend the exclusive St. Paul's School in Concord. Then,
he left for Princeton. While not interested in many academic fields,
Winant immersed himself in Ruskin, Dickens, and the English Chris-
tian Socialists. He later accepted a standing offer from the rector at St.
Paul's to join the faculty, coming back to Concord in time to partici-
pate in the Bull Moose campaign, led in New Hampshire by Governor
Robert Bass. Bass, who went on to lead the Brookings Institution,
became Winant's patron, first in the New Hampshire Legislature, and
later as governor. In 1916 the voters in Concord began Winant's
political career by sending him to the legislature. There he angered
conservatives by introducing legislation to limit the hours of work for
women and children. 9
World War I interrupted Winant's political career. Distin-
guishing himself as a reconnaissance pilot, Winant returned to New
Hampshire as a war hero and prime political material. He teamed up
again with Bass, who had spent the wartime as a planner with the U.S.
Shipping Board and later under Felix Frankfurter at the War Labor
Policies Board. In these positions Bass met a number of individuals
who pioneered efforts to reform American labor law.
By 1920 Bass and Winant had positioned themselves to resume
their Progressive battles against the New Hampshire Republican lead-
ership. Bass sympathized with a group led by Harold Ickes and other
"Bull Moosers" that backed James Cox and FDR in 1920 against "the
same reactionary bunch of politicians against whom they rebelled in
7. See Herbert A. Jump, Six Months in a Strike City, THE SURVEY 48 (August 1, 1922), at
555-57, 584.
8. See ELIZABETH MORISON & ELTING MORISON, NEW HAMPSHIRE: A
BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 184-87 (1976).
9. There are several good biographies of Winant, for example, BERNARD BELLUSH, HE
WALKED ALONE: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN GILBERT WINANT (1968), and Alvin Knepper,
John Gilbert Winant and International Social Justice, (1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
New York University). See also JAMES WRIGHT, THE PROGRESSIVE YANKEES: REPUBLICAN
REFORMERS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1906-1916 (1987).
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1912."' In 1921 Bass formed the New Hampshire Civic Association
to give the "Bull Moosers" an organized home from which to attack
the conservatives. Winant and Bass focused their state attack on the
conservative opposition to labor legislation. Bass had developed an
interest in the minimum wage as a way of stabilizing worker incomes
and protecting companies from the pressure to lower standards.
Winant focused on maximum hours legislation.
In 1924 Bass and other New Hampshire Progressives turned to
Winant as their candidate for governor. He and Bass began to see that
the problems of Manchester called for national legislation. This
awareness grew out of concerns about state labor legislation voiced by
some of Bass' business friends. In December 1923, for example, O.P.
Hussey of the Phillips Rubber Company in Massachusetts warned
Bass that the Massachusetts eight hour law "works an unfair hardship
unless all States unite in such a program.""1 In defending the pro-
posed federal child labor amendment during the campaign, Winant
addressed both Hussey's concerns and turned the defense into a sure
way of gaining Yankee votes:
It is common knowledge that the object of this amendment is to
raise the standards of the South to a parity with those of New
England. There are still a sufficient number of states unmindful
of the abuses of child-labor to keep our national standard lower
than that of many other nations .... We do demand that the
children of the South as well as the children of the North be
afforded an unfettered start and a fair chance in the race of life.
We recognize that the first door leading to equality of opportu-
nity opens into the country's school rooms and that equality of
opportunity is the promise of American life. 2
Of course, such a campaign brought both support and criticism.
Hugh Moore of the Brown Company, the massive paper mill in north-
ern New Hampshire, wrote to Bass, "Personally, I like John Winant,
10. Letter from Edwin M. Lee to Robert Bass (Oct. 14, 1920); see also Letter from Harold
Ickes to Bass (Aug. 24, 1920) (in Robert Bass Papers, Baker Library, Dartmouth College) [here-
inafter Bass Papers]. On the shift from Progressivism to the 1920s, see OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR.,
AN ENCORE FOR REFORM 94, 192 (1967).
11. Letter from O.P. Hussey to Bass (Dec. 15, 1923) in Bass Papers, supra note 10.
12. Winant campaign speech, in Bass Papers, supra note 10. The phrase "promise of
American life," doubtlessly was to send a message to the 1912 Progressives, because this was the
title of the book by Herbert Croly, published in 1909, which became the blueprint for Roose-
velt's campaign; Croly had founded The New Republic and still edited it when Winant ran for
governor. See CHARLES FORCEY, THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM: CROLY, WEYL,
LIPPMANN AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1900-1925 3-51 (1961) (finding Croly representative
of "national liberalism," a form willing to accept comprehensive national government action to
address social and economic problems).
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and believe he is sincere in every respect. I am not, however, im-
pressed by his knowledge of Economics or his attitude on economic
issues."' 3 But then, Winant did not have to win over every industri-
alist, just the majority of voters.
However, Winant did not succeed immediately with other state
politicians. Three items in Winant's large agenda did not pass the
legislature; all were labor law reforms, opposed partly because of the
competitive pressures on the state. Consequently, by 1926 Winant
had become deeply involved in national labor reform movements,
serving on the boards of the National Child Welfare Conference, the
National Consumers' League, and the American Association for La-
bor Legislation (AALL).'4 There he began a special interest in
interstate cooperation to address social problems through his work on
the intergovernmental New England Council. While pursuing these
interests, in 1927, Winant followed state tradition and retired after one
term.15
III. ADDRESSING THE TEXTILE CRISIS
A. The Decline of the New England Mills
The problems at Amoskeag in 1922 began not only a crisis for
the company and Manchester, but also an empirical test of federal
diversity in social policy in the era of global manufacturing. What
began as a state and regional crisis taught unforgettable lessons in
modern economics.
One of the strengths of leaders such as John Winant was the
ability to make policy decisions on the basis of observed evidence,
rather than ideology or legal precedent. Winant did not begin his ten-
ure as governor in 1925 seeking international labor laws. Yet, within a
decade, he was observing the International Labor Organization (ILO)
as a representative of the U.S., and a few years later he headed the
organization, the first American to hold such an international position.
These were not preplanned career steps, but neither were they chance
promotions. Winant followed the evidence, and the evidence clearly
13. Letter from Hugh Moore to Bass (Jan. 10, 1924) in Bass Papers, supra note 10.
14. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE
NEW DEAL 198 (1958). On the AALL, see John B. Andrews, Annual Business Meeting, 17 AM.
LAB. LEGIS. REV. 99 (1927).
15. On his state administration in 1925-27, see H.C. Pearson, THE WINANT
ADMINISTRATION, 58 GRANITE MONTHLY 409-13 (November 1926). See also Knepper, supra
note 9, at 30-36; BELLUSH, supra note 9, at 60-85. Of special interest Bellush describes
Winant's and Bass' leadership in efforts to support Coolidge's proposal to join the World Court
in 1926.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
went from the mills on the Merrimack through the American South
and on to Geneva.
All New England leaders in the early 1920s saw that the region's
textile industry was in crisis. First, there were short postwar declines
in demand and profits. Then the companies cut wages and hours, and
labor unrest followed. Lowell and Fall River had crises much like
Amoskeag. Looking back a few years later, it was clear that these
problems had begun a disturbing trend.16
Regionally, New England's relative share of cotton consumption
peaked in the mid-19th century.17 The really disturbing regional
trend came, however, after 1900, when absolute growth slowed and
the region no longer processed even half of the nation's total. When
national production rose in the late 1920s, finally recovering from the
postwar depression, New England's production stagnated or fell. The
differences between spindles available for production and those active-
ly used makes clear the region's problems. When the South was utili-
zing virtually all the spindles it could put in operation, New England
was disposing of some."
B. Southern Mills Overtake New England's Cost Advantage
The textile industry in America generally was not in decline in
the mid-1920s. Rather, the New England textile industry experienced
rapid decay, while Southern industry expanded. The mid-1920s
marked the arrival of the South as the center of American textile pro-
duction. Data from North Carolina and Massachusetts made this
change clear. In 1925, Massachusetts remained the leading textile
state in the country, as it had for a century, with 96,182 workers pro-
ducing textiles. North Carolina had risen to second place with 84,139.
Only two years later, North Carolina had 95,786 textile workers to
Massachusetts' 90,875. And the trend continued throughout the cen-
tury. Regionally, while Southern employment grew 34,416 from 1925
to 1927, New England employment fell by 9,312.19
Twenty-five new mills opened in the South in the two-year
period. Thirty closed in New England.20 These were not short run
16. Spindles in use at Fall River peaked in the early 1920s and fell dramatically by 1928.
Quite obviously, before the Great Depression, Fall River faced a depression. In New Bedford
the decline, although less severe, followed a similar pattern. JACOB HERBERT BURGY, THE
NEW ENGLAND COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY: A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY 30,
44 (1932).
17. See BURGY, supra note 16, at 60.
18. See BURGY, supra note 16, at 121.
19. See id.
20. BROADUS MITCHELL & GEORGE SINCLAIR MITCHELL, THE INDUSTRIAL
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changes. They continued throughout the twentieth century. By 1977
North Carolina would have 219,100 textile workers; Massachusetts
21,400.21
Leaders such as Winant asked three related questions when
observing their region's dramatic deindustrialization and the simulta-
neous industrial revolution in the South: What caused these changes
to take place? Were the two changes related? And, how could New
England best respond to the changes? It was the answers to these
questions that led to interest in national and then international labor
law.
While a number of factors explained the deindustrialization of
New England and Southern industrial growth, generally the two
trends seem directly related in the textile industry. Students of the
shift of production out of New England identified five factors causing
the changes: technological advances, tax differentials, changes in
management techniques, union penetration rates, and labor standard
22variation.
Technological advances resulted from the introduction of electri-
cal powered mill machinery, which undercut the great New England
water power advantage. By 1925, 86.7% of New England mills were
electrified, a sign of modernization to some, yet an example of a tech-
nology that freed industry from the rushing rivers of the region. Mills
could move anywhere there was electricity, even the South. Worst,
the old mills could not easily accommodate the new equipment, and
faced the temptation to continue running less efficient, but still func-
tioning, older machines. In fact, New England textile machinery
manufacturers undermined their fellow New England textile busi-
nesses by offering cheap credit or even building southern mills, which
then bought large numbers of their latest machines. Finally, the
development of new consumer preferences, particularly for synthetic
fibers, reduced demand for the natural fibers processed by the older
factories. The exceptional advantages New England once had in tech-
nology and experienced personnel in the older factories no longer
existed. Natural fibers and renewable energy were abandoned in a
rush to the artificial and the nonrenewable.3
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 3 (1930).
21. PHILLIP J. WOOD, SOUTHERN CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NORTH CAROLINA 1880-1980 192 (1986).
22. HAREVEN & LANGENBACH, supra note 2, at 333. F.C. Dumaine, Arnoskeag CEO,
listed transportation advantages in the South, but those advantages always had been present.
23. See William H. Miernyk, Unemployment in New England Textile Communities, 78
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 645-48 (June 1955); HAREVEN & LANGENBACH, supra note 2, at 333.
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At the same time the technological revolution was weakening
regional strengths, New England state governments adopted progres-
sive policies not easily sustained with a declining industrial base. As
more government services came to New England communities, prop-
erty tax rates rose. While southern states experienced some of the
same growth in public services, the South always had fewer public
agencies and fewer responsibilities assumed by the government.
Taxes per spindle in Massachusetts nearly tripled during the Progres-
sive Era. In 1919, the average New England tax per spindle stood at
about fifty-five cents, compared to thirty-five in the South.24 In 1929,
the treasurer of Amoskeag Manufacturing Company appealed to a
Manchester public meeting for reduced tax assessments. Taxes,
investment in new technology, and interest on debt exceeded the com-
pany's operating profit. Fearing the consequences, the city cut the tax
rate significantly. Of course, the treasurer failed to explain that the
interest was owed to the parent Boston company, which in the mid-
1920s had withdrawn cash from the corporation, established a holding
company, and required the manufacturing entity to buy itself back
from the owners. They, in turn, reinvested in the South.25
The introduction of scientific management at companies such as
Amoskeag minimized the differences between northern and southern
mills. Yet, only so much efficiency could be milked out of the old
New England factories and their comparatively humane labor tradi-
tions. Southern mills began in a later era and did not have to put
down a tradition of paternalistic responsibility and familiarity with the
work force. Southern mills could easily operate around the clock and
year round. Also, they always had the threat hanging over the heads
of their largely poor white work force of responding to worker com-
plaints by bringing in the more desperate and despised local blacks.26
Other traditions in Southern culture also helped the new management
system. With lower rates of schooling and fewer rights for women,
southern mills more easily utilized the cheap labor of women and chil-
dren. Most importantly, the poorer economic prospects in the South,
especially less alternative employment, made southern workers more
desperate for mill jobs.27
24. See BURGY, supra note 16, at 172.
25. BURGY, supra note 16, at 171-72; HAREVEN, supra note 1, at 30-31, 350-51.
26. MITCHELL, supra note 20, at 145.
27. See PHILLIP J. WOOD, SOUTHERN CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NORTH CAROLINA, 1880-1980 59-93 (1986); Clarence H. Danhoff, Four Decades of Thought on
the South's Economic Problems, in ESSAYS IN SOUTHERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 7-68
(Melvin L. Greenhut & W. Tate Whitman eds., 1964); Harold Marley, A Southern Textile
Epoch, 65 THE SURVEY (Oct. 1, 1930) 17-20, 55-58; Jacquelyn D. Hall et al. Robert Korstad,
Cotton Mill People: Work, Community, and Protest in the Textile South 1880-1940, 91 AM. HIST.
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Low rates of unionization also encouraged southern textile
expansion-not that there were no unions and no strikes in the South,
but the strikes were less frequent and public officials more helpful in
strike suppression than in New England.21 Meanwhile, the new tech-
nology that southern mills installed had ingenious production rate and
quality measuring mechanisms that minimized the advantages New
Englanders had in worker skill and commitment.29
Lastly there were the differences in labor standards between the
regions. The New England states, especially Massachusetts, had a
number of protections not found, at least as strictly, in the South. For
example, the three southern New England states limited the work
week to six days for youth up to sixteen years of age. Massachusetts
set the limit for adult women at nine hours per day and forty-eight
hours per week. The comparable law in North Carolina was eleven
hours per day and fifty-five hours per week. Georgia and South Caro-
lina fully liberated their women by providing no such protection. 30
But the most important difference by region was in wage rate.
Because there were no government mandated minimum wage laws in
the U.S., except in California, wage rates differed markedly by region
for a variety of reasons, including the rate of unionization, or the fear
of it. In textiles this led to a significant difference in the cost of opera-
tion for mills in the two regions. To the credit of northern workers,
New England productivity, or value added per worker, exceeded that
in the South in the mid-1920s. Yet, the problem for New England
was that wage rates exceeded southern rates much more than did the
value added. Consequently, while the average North Carolina worker
was only about 85 percent as productive as one in Massachusetts, the
Massachusetts worker earned almost fifty percent more. Worst for
New England firms, the differential between their wage rates and
those of their southern competitors became greater from the pre-war
years down to 1924. The differential only fell as the textile depression
REV. 245-86 (Apr. 1986). On night work, see IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933 4-5 (1960). See also Gregory Clark, Why
Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the Cotton Mills, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 141-73 (Mar.
1987) (culture mattered in keeping New England developed earlier, but overlooks new methods
of management).
28. See BURGY, supra note 16, at 169.
29. BERNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 11-12. On famous southern strikes, such as Gastonia,
see id. at 20-21; Hall, supra note 27, at 270 (on pioneering methods of surveillance); RICHARD L.
ROWAN & ROBERT E. BARR, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS: TRENDS AND PRACTICES IN THE
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 113-16 (1987); BURGY, supra note 16, at 169-70.
30. See Alice S. Cheyney, International Labor Standards and American Legislation (A Com-
parison), GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES, Vol. 2, No. 8 (1931).
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hit the region. Only toward the end of the 1930s did the differential
31shrink greatly, and by then it was too late for the North to recover.
While there are different interpretations of which factors primar-
ily caused the textile decline, the decline itself was such an obvious
fact that it could not be ignored. Industrialists had to address the
technological and management issues. Political leaders focused on the
tax differential, organized labor, and labor standards. Of course, some
factors could be more easily addressed than others by business and
political leaders. For example, corporations controlled technology,
providing they could secure financing; however, changes in manage-
ment practices were more problematic. The culture of the New Eng-
land mill towns assumed management might be paternalistic, but not
inhumane. As evidenced by the Amoskeag grievances, worker pride
placed limits on cost cutting at the price of quality. And, ultimately,
management changes could lead to labor disputes that undermined
any savings.
C. The Local Response to New England's Textile Decline
Political leaders faced similar limits on their options. Tax reduc-
tions meant reductions in public services, yet the public wanted the
services that defined the quality of life in New England, such as
exceptional educational facilities. There could be some adjustment of
taxes, as Manchester had done for Amoskeag, but New England did
not want to become the South, with poor public services and none
provided for a pariah class, such as the segregated Afro-Americans.
Consequently, responsive Yankee politicians turned to the one factor
in production over which they had control-labor standards.
In the South politicians faced the issue by rejecting significant
labor standard regulation, allowing the competitive market to drive
standards to the lowest level. New England leaders did not have that
option. Their states had enough interest groups supporting improving
standards that some politicians could make careers by identifying with
these interests. Unlike the South, New England had a slightly com-
petitive political system. While Democrats seldom won office, they
did have a power base, especially in the immigrant wards of urban
centers. And they could win statewide office using labor standards as
an issue. Winant's predecessor as governor, Democrat Fred Brown,
had done just that in 1922 during the textile strike in Manchester.
During the strike era in the four lower coastal New England states-
31. On the late 1930s, see WOOD, supra note 27, at 78; for other data, see A.F. Hinricks,
Historical Review of Wage Rates and Wage Differentials in the Cotton-Textile Industry, 40
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1170, 1173 (May 1935).
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New Hampshire to Connecticut-the average Republican vote fell
from 63.5 percent in 1920, to 49.6% in 1922 when they lost the Rhode
Island governorship. This threat made them more willing to consider
candidates who would undermine the Democratic threat, such as John
Winant in New Hampshire in 1924.32 Despite this effort and with
New England native son Calvin Coolidge winning a national land-
slide, in 1924, the Republicans only climbed back to 58.7%.33
Republicans remained at the same point in 1926 and then fell in
the Al Smith campaign of 1928. Their 1928 showing probably would
have been worse had not New Hampshire Republicans run Charles
Tobey, a Progressive ally of Bass and Winant. Tobey was the only
one of the four gubernatorial candidates that year to get over fifty-
three percent of the vote.34
As the textile depression worsened with the onset of the national
Depression, politicians responded in the only way they could: by
looking for creative ways to address the labor standard problem. In
New Hampshire, when Charles Tobey decided to take a break from
government service, as Winant had in 1926, Winant came out of
retirement and offered the voters a continuation of Progressive rule.
He received fifty-eight percent of the vote. No other Republican
gubernatorial candidate got over fifty-one percent that year. The
Republicans held Rhode Island with only 50.5%. In 1932, the Demo-
crats easily swept the other three states, while Winant handily won a
third term. During the four years of his consecutive terms, Winant
brought a little New Deal to New Hampshire, establishing state aid to
mothers and children, financial guarantees to bankrupt local govern-
ments, and centralized poverty relief.
Winant attracted the most national attention when he took the
lead in addressing the competitive labor standards problem. As one
student of Winant said:
For a long time, Governor Winant sought to correct the wide
variation in protective labor standards in the different states. In
these states, contiguous in territory, with similar industrial
developments, and with frequent interchange of workers across
their borders, there were divergent labor laws affording various
degrees of protection to labor and industry. Such a condition,
32. A classic defense of the value of party competition is E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE
SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 137 (1960); for a fuller discussion, see WALTER J. STONE,
REPUBLIC AT RISK: SELF INTEREST IN AMERICAN POLITICS 90-118 (1990).
33. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CQGUIDE TO US ELECTIONS (3d ed. 1994).
34. Id.
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Winant realized, hampered all fair programs and humane stan-
dards.35
Supporters of interstate labor standards had long before formed a
network through the American Association for Labor Legislation
(AALL) and the American Bar Association to exchange thoughts on
the concept. Now the Depression provided the crisis that would allow
these ideas to be applied, if only an innovative politician would lead
the way.
IV. THE PUSH FOR INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
A. Interstate Compacts
The struggle for interstate compacts moved forward with
Winant's efforts to get minimum wage legislation through the New
Hampshire General Court. He not only relied on New Hampshire
partisans, but turned to an extensive network of scholars, activists,
public administrators, and fellow politicians outside of New Hamp-
shire. Among the scholars, he relied on those linked to the AALL and
the Consumers' League. Thus, he tapped into a rich mine of infor-
mation on interstate cooperation or uniformity in law.
As early as 1889, the American Bar Association had appointed a
committee to study interstate legal uniformity, and the following year
New York passed legislation to appoint commissioners to seek the
same goal. Beginning in 1892, the annual Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws met at the site of the ABA convention. In
1912, all the states sent representatives to that conference for the first
time. Three years earlier the Bar Association had drafted a common
child labor law as a way of launching the uniformity process in labor
legislation. That same year, Ernest Freund, of the University of Chi-
cago Law School and president of the Illinois AALL affiliate, pub-
lished a study in The Survey alerting readers to the potential of the
"interstate compact" wording in the Constitution.36 Samuel Lindsay,
who taught social legislation at Columbia University, explored the
idea further in an article called "Reciprocal Legislation." He empha-
sized that the states could create common laws to solve social prob-
lems when the courts prevented Congress from passing a single federal
law. 37
35. Knepper, supra note 9, at 72-73.
36. Ernest Freund, Can the States Co-operate for Labor Legislation? THE SURVEY (June 12,
1909) at 409-11.
37. Samuel McCune Lindsay, Reciprocal Legislation, 25 POL. SC. Q., 435-57 (Sept. 1910).
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From this interest, various intergovernmental organizations
emerged that promoted the movement. For example, in 1926 inter-
ested officials founded the American Legislators' Association. Closer
to the textile problems of New Hampshire, in 1925 Bass helped create
the New England Council to address the common economic concerns
of the region. Winant joined and described the Council as "an exam-
ple of a useful type of regional organization .... Through it the six
governors are called together frequently ... to discuss problems that
affect the people of their states." He warned, however:
We are too prone to imagine that a form of government set up
more than a century ago will, without any effort on our part,
automatically meet all the changes that have taken place in social
and economic conditions.... If you want to hand to posterity
more than debt, if you want to maintain the American ideal of
government, it will be necessary to do something about this
problem of efficiency and coordination and cooperation, this
problem of the mechanics of government.38
While Winant was not the original or leading thinker on inter-
state cooperation, he and Bass provided key leadership to the effort
and were among the first to try to move from theory to practice, and
from region to nation and beyond. They began with the New England
Council, and then Winant sent staff to national groups, such as the
Conference of Government Labor Officials.
While he prepared his next move, others also sponsored inter-
state meetings to address specifically the labor standards problems in
America's industrial heartland. Franklin Roosevelt called an informal
conference of governors to discuss unemployment, which Winant
attended along with the governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and other New England states. University of Chicago economist Paul
Douglas provided the expert leadership, while FDR served as host. It
was at that meeting that FDR and Winant began a personal acquain-
tance, which soon blossomed. A few months later, Pennsylvania Gov-
ernor Gifford Pinchot hosted the Eastern Interstate Conference on
Labor Legislation, which adopted a number of very specific sugges-
tions for common laws on worker's compensation, child labor, and
occupational health. After a delay during the election campaigns of
1932, Governor Joseph Ely of Massachusetts hosted the next meeting
in January 1933.a9
38. John G. Winant, Perils and Possibilities of Our Government by the People, 8 STATE
GOV'T 81-82 (Apr. 1935).
39. See United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Interstate Conference on Labor Laws, 36
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 537 (Mar. 1933); see also FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW
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The Boston meeting in 1933 marked a watershed in the move-
ment in a number of ways. First, Winant took advantage of one of the
darkest moments of the Depression to push through a draft interstate
compact on minimum wages, the first specific outcome from the gath-
erings. Second, the meeting brought together as guest experts officials
who were to play key American roles in the International Labor
Organization. The opening speaker was Edwin Smith, holder of Car-
roll Wright's old position as Massachusetts Commissioner of Labor
and Industry. Six months later Smith was to be one of the four unof-
ficial American delegates to the 1933 annual ILO meeting in Geneva.
Smith explained that the purpose of the Interstate Conference
was "to consider the possibility of united state action to bring about
greater uniformity in the laws governing the hours of employment of
women and minors...." Using the AALL approach, he reminded
the governors that the recommendations were "based on the study and
experience of experts. '"4 He was followed on the podium by Felix
Frankfurter, then of Harvard Law School, and still a Consumers'
League attorney and former supervisor of the international labor law
study for the Inquiry, the academic advisory panel for the World War
I peace process. Following Frankfurter, Amy Hewes of Mount Hol-
yoke spoke. Also a member of the AALL, she had conducted labor
law research for Frankfurter in preparation of the ILO constitution.
Hewes was just completing an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
voluntary Massachusetts minimum wage law. Then Frances Perkins
spoke, still as New York Industrial Commissioner, but soon to be Sec-
retary of Labor. Finally, there was Henry Dennison, a Massachusetts
manufacturer, New England Power executive, and leader of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Dennison, who partici-
pated in a variety of labor standard activities, would be the U.S.
employer delegate to the ILO from the late 1930s until 1944.41
With this preparation, Winant returned to New Hampshire and
began to finalize the strategy to get his state to pass a minimum wage
law that would spark a national standardization drive. New York's
new governor, Herbert Lehman, pushed a similar bill through his leg-
islature. Perkins dispatched future ILO delegate Mary Anderson
from the Women's Bureau to provide Winant with needed informa-
tion, and assigned another future ILO delegate, Grace Abbott, to
launch a campaign to send word of the New Hampshire law to other
104-06 (1946).
40. MONTHLY LAB. REv., INTERSTATE CONFERENCE ON LABOR LAWS 537 (1933).
41. See SANFORD JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE THE
NEW DEAL 15-28 (1997).
[Vol. 23:569
Protecting Labor Standards
governors. To complete the ILO linkage to the event, Winant's
minimum wage coordinator, Ethel Johnson, whom he recruited away
from the Massachusetts minimum wage office, would go on to be his
aide at the ILO and head of the ILO's Washington office during
World War II. Of course, not all of these people were thinking of the
ILO when they worked on the minimum wage project; however, it is
not coincidental that only one of the identified speakers at the Boston
interstate conference and only one of the people identified in the New
Hampshire minimum wage law promotion in the spring did not play a
role in either creating the ILO or representing the United States at the
ILO.
In April 1933 the strategy to utilize the New York and New
Hampshire minimum wage laws to build a national ratification effort
was in place, and both legislatures cooperated. The New Hampshire
Senate even passed the law unanimously. Winant signed it on April
26, 1933. Already the passage of a New York minimum wage law
earlier in the month provided FDR with an excuse to send telegrams
on April 11 to all of the other governors east of the Mississippi and
north of the Potomac, plus the governors of Alabama and North Caro-
lina, urging similar action. In early May, Abbott sent a new wave of
letters announcing the New Hampshire act. Edwin Smith in Massa-
chusetts, writing Perkins a few weeks before leaving for Geneva, said,
"I feel that by next fall when the returns from the New York and New
Hampshire experience begin to come in ... that the chances for suc-
cessfully putting through a [mandatory] minimum wage law here will
be much better. ' 4 2 Soon others agreed and, over the winter, most of
the remaining northeastern states passed some minimum wage leg-
islation. Then on May 29, 1934, commissioners from those states met
in Concord and signed an interstate compact on the minimum wage.43
Despite this triumph, Winant and other politicians engaged in
the interstate compact fight could not remain oblivious to two impor-
tant lessons from this approach to labor standards. First, it was very
time-consuming to try to regulate working conditions using interstate
compacts. More importantly, the compacts would be less than ideal if
all states did not sign on to an agreement. The minimum wage com-
pact of 1934, after several years of extensive preparatory work and the
support of the national administration, only included states with rela-
tively high wage rates. North Carolina and Alabama had been
42. Letter from Smith to Perkins (May 12, 1933) (General Records of Department of
Labor, Office of the Secretary, General Subject File 1933-1941, Minimum Wage to National
Emergency Council, Record Group 174, Box 82, National Archives, Washington, D.C.)
43. American Legislation Association, Interstate Compact for Establishing Uniform Stan-
dards for Conditions of Employment (1934).
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included specifically in the promotion of the compact, yet neither low-
wage state backed the compact.
Given these problems, Winant and Bass, working through the
Brookings Institution, tried to improve the mechanism for interstate
cooperation. They promoted the merger of intergovernmental interest
groups, particularly the Interstate Reference Service and the American
Legislators' Association, into the Council of State Governments.
Winant became its first president in 1934. Meanwhile, Frances Per-
kins invited national labor standards interest groups to a Conference
on Labor Standards in the fall of 1934. That conference turned to
representatives of labor, the churches, and women's groups to facili-
tate follow-up conferences. One committee of the conference planned
a strategy for ratification of the Child Labor Amendment. Another,
including a representative of the AFL, National Catholic Welfare
Conference, National Consumers' League, National League of Wo-
men Voters, and the National Federation of Business and Professional
Women's Clubs, focused on state labor legislation.
Going to the heart of the opposition, they held the second con-
ference in Asheville, North Carolina, in October 1935.44 Yet, even
with extensive preparation, eight states did not attend. 4' There
seemed to be a need for another approach, and for a time this seemed
to lie in corporatism and the National Recovery Act (NRA). Winant
became intensely involved in making the NRA work to resolve labor
issues in the textile industry. Even before the Supreme Court over-
turned the NRA, however, it clearly had not brought a labor standards
solution. Winant and his associates looked for an alternative.
44. See Letter from John Winant President of the Consumers' League to Evans Clark of
the Twentieth Century Fund (Jan. 3, 1936) (in John Winant Papers, National Consumers'
League 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, Box 161) [hereinafter Winant
Papers].
45. See U.S. Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, Agenda of Second Con-
ference of National Organizations on Cooperation in the Improvement of Labor Standards. The
membership in the Committee on State Labor Legislation demonstrated the faithful participation
in the movement of four types of movements. Two of the five members were from women's
movements: Marguerite Wells of the League of Women Voters, and Geline Bowman of the
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs. Members also represented
the Consumers' League, the AFL, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference; in General
Records of Department of Labor, Record Group 174, Box 48. See also Seven States in Compact
on Labor Legislation, LITERARY DIG., June 23, 1934, at 20; see also Winant's speech to the sec-
ond conference, Perils and Possibilities, 8 STATE Gov'T 81-82 (Apr. 1935). On the work of the
Massachusetts Consumers' League, see Letter to Rep. Christian Herter, Oct. 11, 1935, (in Con-




B. From Interstate Compacts to International Treaties
Given the difficulties with interstate compacts and the failure of
the NRA, there really was only one more alternative to accepting state
diversity in labor standards: accepting the ILO. While working on
reciprocal state legislation in 1927, Joseph Chamberlain of Columbia
University had suggested that American supporters of national labor
legislation should learn about the ILO. He reviewed a number of
Supreme Court decisions that recognized that treaties gave the nation-
al government powers otherwise outside its reach. He concluded:
If it is within the scope of the treaty power for the United States
to enter into a Labor Convention such a convention will over-
ride the laws of any state to the contrary. Treaties have fre-
quently had the effect of over-riding state legislation in fields
which without the treaty Congress could not have entered. a6
He referred especially to Missouri v. Holland,47 in which the
Court in 1920 upheld the constitutionality of federal regulation of
migratory birds. Such regulation had been declared unconstitutional
earlier, but the courts upheld it following a 1916 treaty with Britain.
If a treaty could change the status of waterfowl regulation, it could do
the same for federal labor standards. To help clarify the latter con-
nection, the academic network, which long had supported interna-
tional labor standards, went to work explaining what had become
obvious to Winant, Frances Perkins, and others seeking national stan-
dards.
In 1933 the American Academy of Political and Social Science
invited Alice Cheyney, the ILO's Washington office manager, to edit
an issue of The Annals on the International Labor Organization.
Cheyney had Chamberlain do the piece on "Legislation in a Changing
Economic World," which explicitly linked the need for interstate
uniform standards of labor legislation with the work and purposes of
the ILO. Cheyney herself had already written on the topic in 1930,
producing under the auspices of the ILO a comprehensive comparison
of American state labor laws and ILO conventions. Lest readers
become bored with the specialized essays in The Annals, Cheyney got
James Shotwell to write an essay on "The International Labor Organi-
zation as an Alternative to Violent Revolution."4 Cheyney herself
46. J.P. Chamberlain, The United States and the International Labor Organization, 17 AM.
LAB. LEGIS. REV. 171-75 (1927).
47. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
48. See James T. Shotwell, The International Labor Organization as an Alternative to Violent
Revolution, 166 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 18-25 (Mar. 1933).
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wrote a shortened version of her 1930 "Comparison of [ILO] Con-
vention Provisions with Labor Legislation in the United States."'49
One strategy for Cheyney would have been to emphasize that the
ILO conventions primarily would force laggard states to improve their
standards. She pointed out:
It is commonly assumed that the efforts of the International
Labor Organization to effect improvement in working condi-
tions are of only sympathetic interest to the United States. The
general belief is that our working conditions are so far superior
to those of other nations that any standards internationally
applicable will necessarily be lower than our own.
Comparison of the standards set by our labor laws with those
defined in international labor conventions does not confirm this
assumption.50
She then reviewed types of labor standards, from child labor
restrictions through regulations of hours of work, days of rest, forced
labor, immigrant labor, minimum wages, employment agencies,
unemployment insurance, maternity insurance, and occupational
health. She appealed to business, noting two benefits of the ILO. "By
requiring the 'foreign' producer to meet certain conditions and assume
certain financial burdens, it whittles away at whatever comparative
advantage he may have .... By raising the standard of living ... ,it
increases the potential market ... for the American exporter.""
To test the last point, a year earlier the Rockefeller Foundation
sent Carl J. Ratzlaff of Harvard to Europe to study the impact of ILO
labor standards. In 1932 in The American Economic Review, he con-
firmed that ILO conventions did help raise standards in a number of
countries. He therefore concluded that the U.S. should participate in
the organization.12 As with The Annals, this evidence gave important
academic legitimacy to the ILO among the American elite.
Other academics intensified their ILO advocacy. Samuel Lind-
say, who had spent part of 1932 on the ILO staff, worked with the
49. See Alice S. Cheyney, A Comparison of Convention Provisions with Labor Legislation in
the United States, 166 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI 176-89 (March 1933) (revision of
1930 ILO piece).
50. Id. at 176.
51. Id. at 188-89.
52. C.J. Ratzlaff, The International Labor Organization of the League of Nations: Its Signifi-
cance to the United States, 22 AM. ECON. REV. 447-61 (Sept. 1932). JOHN BRUCE TIPTON,
PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
(1959), overemphasized the certainty of Ratzlaff's findings; still it was important to get an ILO
endorsement, even if supported by little evidence, in the American Economic Review. For
Ratzlaff biographical information, see 3 WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, 712-13 (1963).
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American Academy of Political and Social Science, of which he was an
ex-President, to focus its March 1933 volume on the ILO. It was not
coincidental that this was inauguration month in the U.S. A short
time later, James Shotwell completed work on his more substantial
two-volume history of The Origins of the International Labor Organi-
zation. Even before publication in 1934, Shotwell toured Washington
offices dropping off copies of the proofs, overwhelming the recipients
with ILO information. Samuel Lindsay, in his essay in the Shotwell
book, had called the NRA "a milestone of the first importance in the
history of American legislation." 3  With the NRA dead in 1935,
Lindsay and others turned directly to the ILO to establish the labor
protections they desired. They found support in an historic labor
rights advocacy group.
C. The Consumers' League
In December 1933, the Consumers' League, bereft of leadership
with the death of its long time director, Florence Kelley, and the
retirement of its president, John R. Commons, invited Winant to
deliver its annual luncheon speech. He praised Kelley for her "mili-
tant leadership," and then focused on the problems of interstate com-
petition in labor standards, saying:
It has been my belief for a long time that jungle warfare has no
place in modem industry. The exploitation of workers, with
hours and wages as weapons in an attempt to capture markets,
has been a deep underlying cause of our lack of social
advance....
The arguments against labor legislation within industrial states
usually come from the manufacturers who argue that since 48
states comprise competing areas of free tariff and communica-
tion, it is unfair to set up in one state standards regarding wages,
hours of labor and working conditions unless similar standards
are set up in the other states. Hence all efforts should be turned
toward uniform labor laws ....
Later in his address Winant referred to New Hampshire's prob-
lems with the textile industry and expressed hope that the NRA and
interstate compacts would resolve these problems.
53. 1 THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 358 (James T.
Shotwell ed., 1934).
54. John Winant, Address to Consumers' League Luncheon (Dec. 13, 1933), in Winant
Papers, supra note 44, Box 113, (on file with author).
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Two days later, Rosilla Hornblower of the League wrote to
Winant, saying:
It was a privilege to hear your inspiring speech at the Consum-
ers' League luncheon last Wednesday....
I am making a study, for the league, of various outstanding pro-
gressive political figures to see how they stood on social and
labor legislation in the earlier years of their careers .... Our idea
is to prove that it is no detriment to a youthful politician to
champion such causes as the regulation of hours and wages in
industry, old age security, the abolition of child labor, the stabi-
lization of employment, etc.5
5
Thus began the process of moving Winant from "outstanding
progressive" to League president. And, given the concerns of Winant
with interstate competition, it moved the League into the forefront of
battles to win national labor standards. To help Winant, the League
had already hired Lucy Mason, a Virginian, to take Florence Kelley's
place and help confront job flight to the South.
By 1935 the NRA was unconstitutional and interstate compacts
were victims of state intransigence. That year the Massachusetts
League invited Robert Watt of the AFL, just back from Geneva and
the ILO, to discuss the relevance of his experiences there. Watt
linked the recent efforts to develop interstate agreements to protect
labor standards to the ILO:
At the present time, the ILO, which I attended as A.F. of L.
representative from the United States, is the Inter-State Com-
pacts Commission of the World. It has some of the same mer-
its, some of the faults. By and large, with 17 years experience
behind it, the I.L.O. seems to function better than the Inter-
State Compacts Commission meetings in which I have partici-
pated-but it has a much more difficult role to play. 56
The presentation by Watt and the agendas of Winant and
Mason brought a special vitality to the Consumer's League in the
mid- 1930s. The program for the 1935 meeting demonstrated the new
approach. Dorothy Kenyon, who had helped Felix Frankfurter pre-
pare information on international labor standards at Versailles, spoke
on the courts and labor. She helped members plan strategies to win
55. Letter from Rosilla Hornblower to Winant (Dec. 15, 1933) in Winant Papers, supra
note 44, Box 113.
56. Robert M. Watt, address at a dinner given in his honor by the Consumers League and
the Citizen Fact Finding Committee, chaired by E.A. Filene (transcript available in Ethel M.
Johnson Papers, Box 1, Folder 17, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, MA).
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acceptance of the bills they sought to push through legislatures. The
afternoon session focused on the use of interstate compacts to set min-
imum wages and regulate the hours of work. But, the ideas of Robert
Watt had already won the day in the labor standards movement.
Kenyon's relevance was not her legislative strategies, but her experi-
ence from Versailles.
V. JOINING THE ILO
A. The Need for Subterfuge
Even with the crisis of the Depression and the extensive lobbying
by academics, social welfare leaders, and clergy, the American political
system did not move quickly or directly to join the ILO. When the
Administration decided to join in 1934, two years after President Hoo-
ver first sent unofficial delegates to Geneva, it used subterfuge to get
congressional approval. FDR did not request an appropriation until
months after the decision to join. The strategy included waiting until
near the end of the 1934 session of Congress, in June, before request-
ing membership. To confirm the wisdom of the indirect approach,
arch-isolationist Congressman George Tinkham of Boston objected:
[T]his is the hour and this is the time, as we near adjournment
in confusion, when legislation is reported to this House which
never would be reported if due deliberation could be given it. It
is the spawning hour for the propagation of proposals fostered
by corruption, by special interests, by foreign intrigue, and by
conspirators against the public weal....
[T]his resolution is not before the House in accordance with a
fair interpretation of the rules .... There was no notification of
members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs that the resolu-
tion was to be considered, a quorum was not present when the
resolution was reported, and no witness appeared before the
committee.
A letter signed by the Secretary of Labor... was sent to the
committee.... It contains this wholly false statement: "The
organization, "wrote Miss Perkins, referring to the International
Labor Organization, "is not even now an integral part of the
League of Nations."57
While Congressman Tinkham may have been upset with the
decision to join the ILO, Winant began to see it as the solution to the
57. 78 CONG. REC., H 12,238-39 (daily ed. June 16, 1934).
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judicial barrier to labor standards. The interstate compact movement
had failed because only similar states signed on to the minimum wage
compact. Direct federal legislation to standardize labor standards
repeatedly lost in the courts before 1937. He recognized that one pos-
sible solution was to skip beyond the federal government to inter-
national protection of labor standards through the ILO.
Two sources of information greatly contributed to Winant's fas-
cination with the ILO in 1934. First, many social welfare reformers
with whom he had worked effusively praised the ILO at the time of
U.S. entry in 1934. For example, John Gavit, writing in Survey
Graphic said,
This is what makes so momentous on the page of history the
entrance of the United States at last into the International Labor
Organization; more important and significant if possible than
would be its entry into the League itself. For, be it remembered,
the ILO was established in a time of crisis even more intense
than that prevailing now. Its constitution... was written into
the peace treaty, and opens with the pregnant statement that
permanent peace can be established and maintained only on the basis
of social justice .... No nation can effectively establish decent
working and living conditions by itself or within its own bor-
ders. As the preamble of the constitution of the ILO puts it:
"The failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor
is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to
improve conditions in their own countries. 8
Whatever the accuracy of Gavit's assessment, it appeared in one
of the major periodicals of social welfare. The American Association
for Labor Legislation, on whose board Winant served, likewise
rejoiced in U.S. membership. 9
Clearly the ILO convention ratification process provided one
method around the constitutional problems of national welfare and
labor legislation. It is important to appreciate how fearful Winant and
other Progressives were in the mid-1930s that the Supreme Court
would never validate such acts. What else could explain how so prac-
tical a leader as FDR would propose "court packing"? Winant's lead-
ership position in this debate, for example, led to his selection by the
American Academy of Political and Social Science to write the essay
on the constitutionality of social security for an edition of The Annals
devoted to "The Constitution in the 20th Century." There, Winant
58. John Palmer Gavit, History Missing Its Cues, 23 SURVEY GRAPHIC 438 (Sept. 1934).
59. John B. Andrews, What Ho! This ILO?, 27 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV., 101 -09 (September
1937), is a good example of the AALL position on ILO membership.
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put forth his fears that the courts would misunderstand the relation-
ship of the Constitution to changing economic realities, saying of the
new law:
The lawyers will concern themselves with the issue of whether a
specific act is in accord with the specific powers with which
Congress has been endowed by a written document. But social
security is more than a statute, it is a great national necessity;
and the Constitution is more than an aggregate of legal com-
mands engrossed on parchment; it is a living instrument of
national government. The question is whether a great objective
of national policy-the security of a people against the major
hazards of modern industrial life-has, by the constitutional
Fathers, been put beyond the reach of government. Such an
issue belongs to public policy ... upon it a public official, even
though unlearned in the law, has a right to be heard.6"
If ratification of ILO conventions constituted a treaty under the
Constitution, then Congress could pass enabling legislation, prevent-
ing child labor or providing a minimum social security system, so long
as the Senate ratified the appropriate international agreement. Given
this possible solution to the constitutional deadlock in the U.S., the
administration and ILO supporters wanted Winant involved in the
organization. Shortly after the U.S. joined, ILO Director Harold
Butler visited Washington in October 1934, seeking FDR's support
for appointment of an American to a leadership position in the ILO.
Roosevelt, Frances Perkins, and James Shotwell naturally hit upon
Winant, who accepted the appointment upon leaving office in Con-
cord in January 1935.
B. Defining the Roles of Government Agencies
However, two fundamental legal issues arising from ILO mem-
bership needed to be addressed. First, the U.S. had to resolve the
rather complex relationship between the State and Labor Departments
on ILO issues. Second, the administration had not dared face the
question of the relationship of ILO resolutions or conventions to the
U.S. treaty process. Not wishing a fight on membership, the admini-
stration quietly pushed through the resolution to join the organization
without full hearings or analysis of interdepartmental relations. As
membership in the ILO began to produce substantive policy deci-
sions, the two departments had to resolve these questions.
53. John G. Winant, The Constitution and Social Security, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCo. 22 (May 1936). Thomas Reed of the University of Michigan edited this volume,
which appeared in 1936 during the election campaign.
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The Labor Department began negotiations with the State
Department about the relative departmental roles at the ILO in
1936.61 Frances Perkins initiated discussions with State as well about
submitting proposed conventions for treaty ratification. Beginning in
late April 1936, Isador Lubin, the Commissioner of Labor Statistics,
led an unofficial discussion of treaty policy with several old Wilsoni-
ans: James Shotwell, who had directed creation of the ILO at Ver-
sailles; Joseph Chamberlain; other key Department of Labor officials;
and Francis Sayre, Woodrow Wilson's son-in-law, of the State
Department.
They developed three options for treating ILO conventions.
First, they could be submitted to the Senate as treaties. Second, they
could be sent to both houses of Congress as regular legislation.
Finally, given contemporary Supreme Court attitudes towards federal
labor law, they could be submitted to the governors of the states for
state ratification. Lubin and his advisors recommended following the
treaty option for two reasons:
(1) We should establish the precedent of submitting conven-
tions to the Senate so that in the event we wish to test out
the treaty-making power as a vehicle for securing social leg-
islation a definite precedent will have been established.
(2) Under the Supreme Court rulings legislation relative to the
shorter work week, the prohibition of employment of
women in mines and other matters.., do not come within
the legislative competence of the Congress. To be sure, if
the Senate should approve a convention and pass it as a
treaty, legislation would have to be enacted.., by both
houses.62
It is important to recall the context of this planning. Not only
had the Supreme Court repeatedly held federal social and labor legis-
lation to be unconstitutional, but efforts to amend the constitution to
allow a child labor law had failed overwhelmingly in the previous dec-
ade. If the states would not even permit national regulation of child
labor, the possibility of accepting other national standards, such as
regulating hours and wages of adults, seemed remote. Yet, admit-
tedly, many of the elite leaders of the labor standards campaign did
61. Letter from Perkins to Winant, (May 19, 1936) (U.S. Dept. of Labor, ILO Office
Files, Record Group 174, Box 74); Letter from Hull to Perkins (Mar. 20, 1936) (National
Archives, Washington, D.C.).
62. Memorandum from Isador Lubin to Frances Perkins on "Submission of ILO Conven-
tions" (May 20, 1936) (U.S. Dept. of Labor, ILO Office Files, RG 174, Box 74).
[Vol. 23:S69
Protecting Labor Standards
not like the inexact and often crude world of popular politics and were
glad to search for a solution in the esoteric world of international law.63
C. Building Support Through the ILO Committee
Winant and the old elite leaders of the AALL joined together to
form a new group to support the ILO. Working quietly with the
League of Nations Association, they established a National ILO
Committee, chaired by Samuel Lindsay of Columbia University.
Other members included academics with long experience related to
labor legislation, including James Shotwell, Joseph Chamberlain, Leo
Wolman from Columbia, and Carl Ratzlaff of Harvard. There was
also John Andrews from the AALL and Lucy Mason, the Virginian
who had succeeded Florence Kelley at the Consumers' League.
In contrast to the AALL, a number of the members had special-
ized in international law and international relations, including Manley
Hudson of Harvard and Carol Riegelman and Paul Taylor from the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Other experts came
from the field of industrial relations, especially William Leiserson,
Elmer Anderson, and Thomas Spates. Finally, the Committee
included a southerner, Charles Pipkin of LSU, and a religious leader,
James Myers of the Federal Council. The Carnegie Endowment
headed by Shotwell provided office space at Columbia University.64
The National ILO Committee provided powerful backing for the
ILO at a time when isolationism threatened to overwhelm any Ameri-
can commitment abroad. To be successful in this atmosphere, Lind-
say and Winant made several strategic decisions. The Committee was
an elite group, but one that sought a national membership and even
state and local chapters. The inclusion of Charles Pipkin was part of
that strategy, although it was hard to hide the overwhelming linkage
not merely to New York, but to the Upper West Side. Another strat-
egy included separating the ILO Committee from the League of
Nations Association.
The ILO Committee feared the League as an albatross around
the neck of U.S. internationalism. When Winant addressed the Com-
mittee in 1935, the minutes reported:
The main point of [his] talk was that the I.L.O. and the League
of Nations should be kept separate in the minds of the American
people ... He felt that there was no question but that Congress
63. On strategy, also see letter from Frances Perkins to William Phillips, Under Secretary
of State (May 5, 1936) (U.S. Dept. of Labor, ILO Office Files, RG 174, Box 74).
64. On board, see Minutes of ILO Committee, Sept. 26, 1935, in Winant Papers, supra
note 44, Box 169.
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approved the resolution on the I.L.O. with the understanding
that there would be no commitments with the League. 65
And of course, he was correct. American membership in the
ILO was a remarkable achievement, given that the U.S. never even
joined the World Court. Considering U.S. exceptionalism in social
welfare policy, participation in the ILO was little short of miraculous.
Mindful of this, the Committee focused on a cautious public
education strategy and not a mass public propaganda campaign. It
avoided any publicity that might be designed to promote U.S. coop-
eration with the League. This caution was easy to criticize. John
Andrews has been attacked for failing to lead the AALL to reach out
to a wider public, allegedly because of his comfort in working with
academic and social welfare experts.66 Yet, his was a reasonable
approach given exceptionalism.
Understanding popular xenophobia, the leaders of the ILO
Committee copied Andrews' general approach. Winant called for
reaching out to "State Labor Commissioners... and educating the
proper people."67 Andrews proposed ranking the goals of the Com-
mittee to "first, increase the number of influential citizens who know
about [the ILO]."6" Winant, Lindsay, and Andrews did want to reach
out to the general public eventually, but their strategic priorities
probably were correct. Any mass ILO support group in 1935, e~ren if
it would have been possible, would have been an ephemeral movement
among the mass of American workers. Rather, good education extol-
ling the value of labor internationalism could build the solid support
for the ILO that would sustain American involvement.
In 1935 support for joining the ILO came primarily from those
concerned with the problem of the judicial veto of national labor leg-
islation. Thus, the ILO committee intensified efforts to understand
and promote the use of the treaty power to bring standards. The
committee sponsored two efforts to address this need. First, in 1935,
Spencer Miller, who served both as one of the labor representatives on
the committee as well as Episcopal Church liaison to the labor move-
ment, chaired a week long conference on the ILO at the University of
65. Minutes of the I.L.O. Committee, Sept. 26, 1935, in Winant Papers, supra note 38,
Box 169; see also Proposed Program of Work for the National I.L.O. Committee 1935-36, in
Winant Papers, supra note 44, Box 169.
66. THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 198-204 (1992), in discussion of national
health insurance campaign of the AALL, points out that the leadership did not like appeals to
popular support, preferring elite lobbying.




Virginia attended by 350 academics, employers, and labor leaders.
Not only did the Committee sponsor the conference in the South to
reach out beyond its base, it also published under Miller's editorship
the key papers, entitled What the International Labor Organization
Means to America.69 In the introduction, Winant captured the essen-
tial goal of American membership, reminding readers:
One of the hardest tasks of the International Labor Conference
is to build up standards in countries that we might describe as
backward. A thing that is of particular interest to all countries
of the world is relative standing. That is particularly true when
we are dealing with world markets. We find right here in the
United States that competition can be so severe that it is
destructive of capital, of profit, and of human beings, and just as
men here fight to maintain these standards, so it is necessary
that we use our influence to maintain world standards. That is
the major function of the International Labor Organization.7"
In addition to the Virginia conference and Miller's book, the
Committee sponsored specialized studies. The executive secretary of
the Committee, William Lonsdale Tayler, wrote specifically on the
major American problem with ILO standards, in Federal States and
Labor Treaties-Relations of Federal States to the International Labor
Organization.71 As he said to Winant,
I have come to the conclusion that the treaty-making power of
the Federal Government is broad enough to enable the United
States to ratify the Labor Conventions thereby assuming an
active role in the ILO. Once the Labor Conventions are rati-
fied, it necessarily follows that the Government would have
72power to pass legislation effectuating the treaties.
While the Virginia conference was a strategic success, the Com-
mittee faced a problem in finding diversified support for ILO mem-
bership. Business interest was declining and more often only labor
and the churches actively backed U.S. participation. Spencer Miller's
role in linking the church and labor symbolized what was to become a
distinctly American base of support for the movement. Business
opposition was also soon to be peculiarly American.
69. WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION MEANS TO AMERICA
(Spencer Miller, Jr., ed., 1936).
70. John G. Winant, "Forward," in WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION MEANS TO AMERICA, supra note 69, at xii.
71. WILLIAM LONSDALE TAYLER, FEDERAL STATES AND LABOR TREATIES (1935).
72. Letter from William Lonsdale Tayler to Winant (Jan. 15, 1936), in Winant Papers,
supra note 44, Box 169.
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The late 1930s proved a good time to address the legal issues
relative to the ILO. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed, in that era
American business did not have the nearly pathological fear of the
ILO that surfaced after 1945.73 Soon international crises and then
World War II distracted American ILO policy. In 1944, at the Phila-
delphia Conference, the ILO's purpose to protect fundamental labor
rights and to control the worst features of laissez faire were trium-
phantly reaffirmed. Labor was to be a sacred part of the human expe-
rience, freed of market forces, its dignity to be protected by all nations.
Unfortunately, the Administration did not take full advantage of the
ILO honeymoon.
VI. THE POSTWAR ANTI-ILO REACTION
Once World War II ended, opponents of labor's special status
and of the ILO as its protector emerged both in the Communist bloc
and, especially, in the United States. A large segment of the American
business community, supported by sympathetic lawyers, economists,
and other academics prepared to confront the use of the ILO to bring
European-style social democracy across the ocean. That the U.S.
refused to ratify any ILO conventions from the end of the war through
the late 1980s demonstrates their success. Yet, perhaps this opposi-
tion also teaches an important lesson for the new century. Winant saw
ILO standard setting as a way around the exceptional American oppo-
sition to meaningful legal protections for the dignity and rights of
labor. The extreme and steadfast opposition to the ILO among many
on the American right may provide the best proof that he was right.
The industrial opposition to the ILO after World War II was
part of a more general business assault on labor rights and social wel-
fare ideas. Domestically, it included public education and employee
training in free market liberalism, opposition to extensions of the wel-
fare state, especially national health insurance, and restrictions on
labor rights, symbolized by the Taft-Hartley Act.74 Opposition in-
cluded aggressive use of the courts to restrict the rights of workers
through interpretation." Reinforcing these efforts was the general
mobility of capital, slowly to the South in the early postwar years and
later off shore. The strategy halted the expansion of the New Deal
73. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The United States and the International Labor Organiza-
tion, 1889-1934 335 (1960) (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy).
74. ELIZABETH A. FONES-WOLF, SELLING FREE ENTERPRISE: THE BUSINESS ASSAULT
ON LABOR AND LIBERALISM: 1945-1960 (1994) (although I would maintain the assault was
from a liberal free market perspective).
75. Robert M. Smith, Using Knowledge Rather Than Goons: Modern Antiunion Agencies,
1956-1985, 28 MICH. ACADEMICIAN 401-18 (1996).
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welfare state and of organized labor, and began to turn back both.
Politically, this process began with conservative victories in the 1946
elections. It moved forward, especially with regard to labor, as a result
of McCarthy era charges of widespread Communist influence in
unions. In the longer run, union vigor suffered from the economic
complacency during the postwar economic boom and from divisions
within the labor movement. Consequently, the era witnessed a
remarkable return to popularity of classical liberalism.76 This triumph
brought an end to efforts to utilize the ILO to overcome American
policy exceptionalism.
Postwar business leaders included an effective attack upon the
ILO in the business press and among academics linked to business.
The National Economic Council, a well-funded right wing business
lobbying group, played a leading role in the education effort.7 Espe-
cially under the leadership of Merwin Hart in the late 1940s, the
Council focused on the ILO as a threat to free enterprise. Hart, who
had been a leader of right wing causes in the 1930s and early 1940s,
used the Economic Council Letter to attack the ILO. In October 1948,
for example, he devoted the issue to the ILO and titled it "World
Government-By the Back Door." He warned readers that "This
Letter is one of the most important NEC has ever published. We
therefore offer to send each subscriber up to five copies upon
request ... 78 The following month the letter specifically attacked
the general leftward trend of the labor movement and the ILO "since
1919" and of the planned use of the ILO to override the Supreme
Court. He warned, "[The] ILO has aptly been described as 'the 'UN'
of all do-gooder activities pertaining to world totalitarianism.'
Focusing on David Morse, the American head of the ILO, Hart
accused him of having presided over the American Military
Government (AMG) in Germany at precisely the time "of the Stalin-
ist influx into AMG." What especially disturbed Hart and his allies
was the very issue that had made Winant and others first interested in
the ILO, that ILO conventions, if ratified as treaties, would supersede
constitutional barriers to federal social policy. Hart saw, "The cloak
of legality for this conspiracy is a clause in the Constitution ... which
obviously was never intended to be used as the international leftists
76. See, e.g., RICHARD FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN
PERSPECTIVE 99-103 (1990).
77. See High Lobby Costs Told to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1954, at 55, which reported
it among leading lobbying organizations in Washington, based upon amount spent on lobbying.
78. National Economic Council, Inc., World Government-By the Back Door, ECON.
COUNCIL LETTER (Oct. 1, 1948).
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are attempting to use it now."79 The rightists then began an effort to
amend the Constitution to limit the treaty power.
The primary reason for business opposition to the ILO was the
specific ILO conventions, especially those related to women, forced
labor, and health insurance, finalized in the period before 1954. At
various times in the era, American business focused on those conven-
tions dealing with women's equality, maternity and child allowances,
guaranteed health insurance, and forced labor.8" From its founding
the ILO had as a fundamental principle equal pay for equal work, and
it added maternity protections in one of its first conventions in 1919.
In the postwar era, however, the ILO went beyond general prin-
ciples to define special protections for women and children. In 1946
three conventions dealt with the medical examination of youthful
workers and restricted night work for minors. In 1948 came restric-
tions on night work for women. While the U.S. did not ratify these
conventions, they did not cause much of a stir among business leaders
compared to what was to come. In 1951 Convention 100 called for
equal remuneration for equal jobs. The following year, Convention
103 guaranteed pregnant women twelve weeks of maternity leave and
at least six weeks of postmaternity leave. While on leave, women were
"entitled to receive cash and medical benefits," and the cash should be
"sufficient for the full and healthy maintenance of herself and her
child in accordance with a suitable standard of living."8' As with the
other conventions of the era, the U.S. refrained from ratification, but
now the business community was not just upset, it was frightened.
To make matters worse, there were Conventions 87 and 98,
passed in 1948 and 1949, asserting the right of workers to free associa-
tion and to organize. At the same time that American business was
succeeding in getting the Taft-Hartley law at home, it seemed the
ILO might be undermining regulation of labor unions. Charles
McCormick, of the Baltimore Spice Company, led the new business
approach at the ILO after he became employer delegate in the late
1940s. He said of Convention 98, "If this convention had been sub-
mitted to the Senate and ratified, the conflicting sections of the Taft-
Hartley law would have been nullified automatically (as would many
state statutes). The House of Representatives, in which support for
79. National Economic Council, Inc., ILO Rides Again, for More World Government Over
USA, ECON. COUNCIL LETTER, 1-4 (Nov. 1, 1948).
80. See, e.g., Socialistic Blueprint for Security to be Supported by U.S. at ILO, NAT'L
CHAMBER WASH. REP. (June 13, 1952) (George G. Higgins Papers, International Labor
Organization Series, Catholic University of America Archives, Washington, D.C.).
81. International Labor Organization, Convention 103, June 28, 1952, Art. 3 and Art. 4.
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the Taft-Hartley law is especially strong would have had no voice in
the matter.",
2
Finally, there was the Social Security Convention passed in 1952,
which committed any signatory to minimum universal health benefits.
The AMA and insurance industry joined with other business lobby-
ists to oppose this commitment. What upset McCormick about this
convention was the process for approval in Geneva. "[T]he two most
influential delegates in the conference, our government delegates,
voted along with the U.S. worker delegate and the Socialist major-
ity...."" This was the era before most Communist governments
had joined the ILO. McCormick's Socialists were the delegates from
Western Europe. During this era American business was not at war
simply with communism; the distinction between communism and
social welfare democracy was a matter of concern for labor and other
western opponents of liberal materialism.
When McCormick discussed his opponents in the ILO it was as
if he was referring to Communists. For example, he claimed, "[A]s
the ILO has pushed further and further into controversial economic
and social matters, the sessions have become more and more a battle-
ground for a continuing struggle between the two powerful ideologies
of the West-free enterprise, and Western European Socialism."4
Writing in The Nation's Business, he complained that "the ILO has yet
to show genuine admiration for the way of life which has given Amer-
ica's 150,000,000 citizens the highest standard of living the world has
ever known."8" This was no longer an era when American business
and labor shared a common view of the world. Now, anyone not for
the classic free market was the enemy, and in the spirit of the McCar-
thy era, implicitly a Communist ally.
McCormick raised in a more credible way than had other busi-
ness leader the fear of getting social welfare reform through the treaty
power. The awareness of this danger he traced
[to when] a joint committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and National Association of Manufacturers--discovered that the
ILO was no longer simply a standard-bearer for the smaller,
underdeveloped nations. It had emerged as a gushing fountain
of statist social and economic schemes, which aimed at higher
82. Charles P. McCormick, ILO-A Body That Might Make America's Laws, USA: THE
MAGAZINE OF AM. AFFAIRS, Mar. 1952, at 88.
83. Id. at 87; see also Editorial: "Can't Public Members Represent the Public?" SATURDAY
EVENING POST (July 12, 1952).
84. McCormick, supra note 82, at 86.
85. Charles P. McCormick, We're Using the Socialist Soapbox, 50 NATION'S BUS., Mar.
1952, at 43-45 and 78-79.
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living standards through more and more government decree
rather than by more and more production.
8 6
As this argument circulated repeatedly through business attacks
on the socialistic ILO, it became linked to the efforts to ratify the pro-
posed Bricker Amendment, which would have weakened the impact of
treaties by making them effective only when in full accord with exist-
ing U.S. law. 7 McCormick wrote in 1952 in the Nation's Business,
"[Employers feared] a vote-conscious prolabor Administration might
seek to by-pass an unsympathetic Supreme Court with an ILO con-
vention.""8 In addition to coverage in the popular business press, the
issue received more thorough legal consideration in a research report
sponsored by the American Enterprise Association (AEA). The
report related the hearings for the Bricker Amendment to the ILO,
concluding, in the words of future Secretary of State John Foster Dul-
les, that the amendment was necessary to protect "the rights given the
people by their Constitutional Bill of Rights." 9
Only with the neoliberalism of the last decade, as global eco-
nomic competition threatened to reward those who race fastest to the
bottom in labor standards, locating production in nations with the
weakest labor protections, have the arguments of Dulles, McCormick,
and Hart been overcome. After years of refusing to ratify even the
convention banning forced labor, the U.S. has ratified a few ILO stan-
dards.9" Most importantly, in June 1998 the U.S. business delegate
led support for global enforcement of core labor standards. 91 A cor-
rective for the failure of the World Trade Organization to effectively
link trade and human rights policy, the ILO's Declaration of Princi-
ples may signal the realization of Winant's dream, if a half century
late.92 That this movement has been led by a new cohort of interna-
tional human rights lawyers is especially heartening and may also sig-
86. Id. at 44.
87. Let's Look Before We Adopt 'Em, 51 NATION'S Bus., June 1953, at 98 (editorialized
especially against the maternity protections that might be imposed by the ILO).
88. McCormick, supra note 82, at 44.
89. LEONARD J. CALHOUN, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AND
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW 48 (American Enterprise Association, 1953) (the American
Enterprise Association later became the American Enterprise Institute).
90. See Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role,
11 COMP. LAB. LAWJ. 48-79 (1989).
91. See International Labor Organization, International Labour Conference, Report of the
Committee on the Declaration of Principles. Discussion in Plenary, 86th Session, June 1998.
92. See Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and




nal a new emphasis in the legal profession in defining both the
international and domestic meaning of the dignity of labor. 3
93. Consider the creation of human rights centers, such as the Schell Center at Yale Law
School and the work of the American Bar Association's Section of International Law and Prac-
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ILO conventions on human rights .... 30 INT'L LAW. 653 (1996).
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